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According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can 
occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of 
hardware problems in a computer. This paper argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by 
introducing the ‘natural dysfunction analysis’ of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then 
analyse the necessary conditions for realiser autonomous dysfunction. Building on this, I show 
that software functions disassociate from hardware functions in a way that mental functions do 


















According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can 
occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of 
hardware problems in a computer. This paper argues that this argument is unsound and should 
be rejected.  
The AAMD serves two primary philosophical purposes. Firstly, it is employed to counter 
the anti-psychiatric contention that mental disorders that are not brain disorders are not real 
(Papineau 1994; Kingma 2013; cf. Szasz 1960). Secondly, it is invoked to show that the blanket 
doctrine that all mental disorders are ipso facto brain disorders fails to hold up (Wakefield 
2014a; cf. Insel et al. 2010)1. According to its proponents, the argument from the computer 
analogy establishes that real, scientifically respectable mental disorder can occur in the absence 
of brain dysfunction, and that this is compatible with physicalism and with our best 
philosophical theories of disorder.  
 As I shall proceed to show, the AAMD is unsound. There is a crucial disanalogy between 
software-hardware and mind-brain. Not all software functions are hardware functions; but all 
mental functions are brain functions. As such, the analogy fails, and the argument fails to 
support its stated conclusion.  
 I begin by introducing the natural dysfunction analysis of disorder, before outlining the 
AAMD as per Wakefield and Papineau. I then analyse the general conditions under which a 
failure to perform some process P constitutes a dysfunction of an item X. Building on this, I 
 
1 This kind of view features prominently in the scientific and biomedical discourse. It was explicitly adopted by 
the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative at the beginning of the last 
decade – a move which continues to cause controversy (Insel, et al, 2010; Insel and Cuthbert, 2015; cf. 
Borsboom et al., 2019).  
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explain why some computer software functions fail to satisfy these conditions in respect of the 
hardware. Because some software functions are not selected effects of the hardware, 
autonomous software dysfunction is possible. In contrast, all mental functions are necessarily 
selected effects of the brain. This is the crucial disanalogy between software-hardware and 
mind-brain. The AAMD thus fails, and its conclusion must be rejected. Properly understood, 
autonomous mental dysfunction cannot obtain.  
 
2. The Natural Dysfunction Analysis 
 
I shall first consider, in general terms, the theory of medical disorder from which the argument 
for autonomous mental disorders proceeds2. We will call this view the ‘natural dysfunction 
analysis’.  
 According to the natural dysfunction analysis, disorder is natural dysfunction, and natural 
function should be construed in accordance with the etiological or evolutionary theory of 
biological function.  
In other words, something like the following is assumed:  
 
It is a natural function of an item X in an organism O to do that “which items of X’s 
type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O's ancestors, and which caused the 
genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.” 
(Neander 1991, 174).  
 
 
2 I am using the term ‘medical disorder’ or ‘disorder’ in a broad, general sense to refer to phenomena 
legitimately inherent to the medical realm, including psychopathology (roughly in accordance with Wakefield’s 
usage) (see Wakefield, 2014b). 
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If some item X is unable to (adequately) perform one of X’s natural functions, then that 
constitutes a natural dysfunction of X.  
 
Medical disorder is natural dysfunction.  
 
The formulation ‘item’, in the above, is deliberately noncommittal as to whether the locus of 
disorder is the mechanism, system, organ or something else, but paradigmatically, it will be an 
organ or a part of an organ.  
To give an indication of how this analysis can be applied in practice, one might reason that 
the inability of some particular human heart to pump blood constitutes a ‘medical disorder’, 
because ‘blood pumping’ is an effect which contributed to the inclusive fitness of our ancestors, 
such that the genotype which codes for the development of the phenotype ‘heart’ was naturally 
selected.  
Both Papineau’s and Wakefield’s versions of the AAMD proceed from views akin to the 
natural dysfunction analysis. Wakefield famously defends what is often referred to as the 
‘harmful dysfunction analysis’ of medical disorder. On this view, medical disorder is jointly 
composed of (1) a value relative harm component – “some harm or deprivation of benefit to 
the person” (1992, 384) – and (2) a value-neutral dysfunction component – “the inability of 
some internal mechanism to perform its natural function” (p. 384). Natural functions, according 
to Wakefield, are effects that are “part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and 
structure” (1992, 384) of a mechanism. Similarly Papineau, following Neander (1983), takes 
disorder to be constituted by “biological dysfunction”, which he defines as: “items not 
producing the effects ... in virtue of which they were naturally selected” (Papineau 1994, 81). 
Papineau also invokes an additional, seemingly evaluative, condition. According to Papineau, 
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a biological dysfunction “only counts as an illness if it is also in some sense incapacitating” 
(1994, 81).  
For the purposes of the present argument, I shall proceed as if dysfunction were both 
necessary and sufficient for disorder. Whether a value-relative criterion is needed is an 
interesting question, but one that would take us too far afield. See Cooper (2017) and Wakefield 
(2014b) for recent discussion of key issues. 
 
3. The Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD)  
 
Different versions of the AAMD share the contention that mental disorders can occur in the 
absence of any disorder of the brain, yet still be real disorders with a scientifically respectable 
physical basis – just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a 
computer (Papineau 1994; Arpali 2005; Wakefield 2006; Cooper 2007; Kingma 2013; Graham 
2013; Jefferson 2020). In the main body of this paper, I consider a version of the argument 
which explicitly proceeds from the natural dysfunction analysis, following Wakefield and 
Papineau. I consider the implications for non-naturalists about mental disorder in the final 
section of this paper (8.3.).  
 
 
3.1. Wakefield  
 
According to Wakefield, there are two scenarios in which a condition counts as a mental 
disorder but not a brain disorder.  
Firstly, a mental disorder is autonomously mental when a mental dysfunction is realised by 
a ‘normal’ non-dysfunctional brain state. The possibility of this is implied by the possibility of 
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software problems in the absence of hardware problems. Wakefield invites us to consider the 
computer analogy:  
 
A computer’s software runs in the hardware and therefore a given state of the software 
while running is always at any given moment identical to some hardware state, but the 
software can nevertheless malfunction even though there is no malfunction whatever 
in the hardware. It is true that every software malfunction has some hardware 
description; that is not at issue. Rather, the point is that a software malfunction need 
not be a physical hardware malfunction. Analogously, even if all mental states are 
physical states, it does not follow that a mental dysfunction is a physical dysfunction. 
(Wakefield 2006, 129)  
 
He repeats this contention in a 2014 critique of the RDoC’s commitment to the view that mental 
disorders are necessarily brain disorders (2014a), and again in two recent (2017, 2020) papers 
on addiction:  
 
The invalidity of “all mental disorders are in the brain, therefore all mental disorders 
are brain disorders” is suggested by the invalidity of the analogous argument: All 
computer software runs in computer hardware, therefore all software malfunctions must 
be hardware malfunctions. (Wakefield, 2017, 57)  
 
Secondly, Wakefield takes it that a mental disorder is autonomous when it is multiply realised 
neurobiologically. He does not offer an independent argument for why the multiple realisability 
of a mental dysfunction would negate its being realised by a brain dysfunction – he merely 
cites Brülde and Radovic (2006), who in turn cite Svennson (1990). More recently, Jefferson 
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(2020) has offered an argument with a similar implication. I agree with Wakefield that multiply 
realised mental dysfunctions (i.e. the second scenario) raise different issues from the first (i.e. 
the analogy to software-hardware). These are separate contexts, which regrettably are often 
confused and conflated in the literature. I however reject Wakefield’s contention that whether 
a mental dysfunction is multiply realised is of relevance to whether it is, or is not, a brain 
dysfunction. This simply does not follow, and to think otherwise is a deductive error. I shall 
outline an argument for this in Section 8.2.  
For now, we shall leave multiple realisation to one side, and focus on the first case: the 
argument for autonomous mental disorder from the computer analogy.   
 
3.2. Papineau  
 
The earliest version of the AAMD remains the most explicit and persuasive. In what follows, 
I lay out the argument as originally offered by Papineau. I will refer back to Papineau in 
assessing the soundness of the AAMD (Section 4 onwards). Somewhat reconstructed, 
Papineau’s argument can be analysed in seven steps:  
 
1. Disorder just is natural dysfunction.  
 
Papineau holds that disorder is biological dysfunction, and that biological dysfunction is a 
matter of ‘items’ not doing whatever it is they were naturally designed to do. This, as explained 
in Section 2, is a version of the natural dysfunction analysis.  
 




Like Wakefield, Papineau appeals to the computer metaphor:  
 
Suppose that you and I are both using MS Word 5.0 as our word processing program, 
but that you are working on a PC while I am working on a Macintosh. Now suppose 
that there is some bug in the program. For example, suppose that whenever either of us 
tries to double-space a highlighted section, that section gets deleted. This obviously 
wouldn't show that there was anything physically wrong with our machines. ... The 
logic circuits are all working as they are supposed to. Rather, the fault lies entirely at 
the software level. (Papineau, 1994, 79).  
 
The hardware is doing everything it is supposed to be doing – in terms of responding correctly 
to the software code – and yet something is clearly going wrong. That ‘going wrong’ cannot 
however be attributed to the hardware of either computer. Indeed, the malfunction, in this case, 
is unique to the software3. Papineau thus establishes the possibility of ‘autonomous software 
dysfunction’. In the case of computer processing, dysfunctions of the supervenient property 
(the software) can occur in the absence of any dysfunction whatsoever of the realising property 
(the hardware).  
 
3. Mind-brain is analogous to software-hardware in all relevant respects.  
 
 
3 One might wonder whether, in Millikanian terms, the hardware has the derived proper function of performing 
specific software functions such as double spacing (Millikan 1989). If so, then ‘failure to double space’ could 
count as a (derived) hardware malfunction. It would appear to be an assumption of Papineau’s argument that 




An analogy is not in and of itself sufficient for an argument; it also needs to be an apt one. 
More specifically, the analogy has to apply in all ways relevant to the case4. Papineau seems 
to take the applicability of the analogy to follow from non-reductive physicalism. The thought 
is perhaps something like this: because the computer analogy is frequently invoked to illustrate 
the phenomenon of multiple realisation, and because mental types are generally multiply 
realised in distinct neurobiological types, the computer analogy applies to the case of mind-
brain.  
 As I shall show, the computer analogy does not in fact apply to the case of mind-brain (and, 
in any case, it would not follow from non-reductive physicalism that it does). In other words, 
I will reject premise 3.  
 
4. From 2 and 3, mental dysfunction need not imply brain dysfunction.  
 
4 is the logical consequence of 2 and 3. If it is true that software dysfunction can occur in the 
absence of hardware dysfunction (2), and it is true that mind-brain mirrors software-hardware 
in this respect (3), then mental dysfunction need not imply brain dysfunction (4).  
 
5. Mental dysfunction can be ‘natural’.  
 
On Papineau’s view, it is not just paradigm biological items, like organs and limbs, that can 
have ‘natural functions’. Mental ‘items’ (systems, mechanisms, modules or the like) are also 
selected “in the course of genetic evolution and individual learning” (1994, 81) for the 
 
4 Roughly speaking, a fact is ‘relevant’ if its truth/falsity would make a difference to whether the analogy does 
(or does not) imply autonomous mental disorder.  
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production of certain mental effects. If natural mental functions are possible, then natural 
mental dysfunctions – where a mental item fails adequately to yield one of its selected effects 
– are presumably also possible.  
 
6. From 4 and 5, natural mental dysfunction need not imply natural brain dysfunction.  
 
If mental dysfunction need not imply brain dysfunction (4), and mental dysfunctions can be 
‘natural’ (in the sense of being a failure in a naturally selected effect, as per 5), then natural 
mental dysfunction need not imply natural brain dysfunction.  
 
7. From 6 and 1, autonomous mental disorder is possible.  
 
Because natural mental dysfunction need not imply natural brain dysfunction (per 6), and 
because disorder is natural dysfunction (per 1), mental disorder need not imply brain disorder. 
Mental disorders that occur in the absence of brain disorder are thus ‘autonomous’.  
 
3. 3. The virtues of autonomy 
 
We are thus led to conclude the following. The mind is nothing over and above the brain, yet 
mental disorder does not necessarily imply brain disorder. The former claim does not infringe 
upon the latter; indeed the ‘autonomy’ of mental disorders follows from standard run-of-the-
mill non-reductive physicalism about the mind-brain relation. Nevertheless, mental disorders 
are still real medical disorders, constituted by natural dysfunction. The AAMD thus dissolves 




 In philosophy of psychiatry, being able to combine physicalism, realism and non-
reductionism about mental disorder is attractive in that their theoretical antonyms 
(reductionism, non-physicalism and eliminativism about mental disorder) are generally viewed 
as undesirable. It is not obvious prima facie, however, how non-reductionism (mental disorders 
are not brain disorders), physicalism (mental disorders are physical) and realism (mental 
disorders are real) can be combined. At first sight, if we accept that everything that exists is 
physical (physicalism), and that mental disorders are real (realism), then we are led to conclude 
that mental disorders are really physical disorders (reductionism). We could instead reject 
physicalism – and maintain that mental disorders are real, but non-physical – but this would be 
intolerable to most contemporary philosophers and scientists. If we maintain however that 
mental disorders are not physical disorders (non-reductionism), but accept that everything that 
exists is physical, then it seems we are led to conclude that mental disorders do not really exist 
(eliminativism).  
This latter inference is made in some anti-psychiatric contexts (prominently by Szasz 1960) 
and was the target of Papineau’s original argument (1994). Thus, the AAMD provides an 
escape route from an underlying conflict in theoretical desiderata which has plagued psychiatry 
and the philosophy thereof for decades. This ideologically convenient property of the AAMD 
may go some way to account for the relative lack of critical resistance to this line of argument 
in the literature.  
 
4. What is it to be a dysfunction of X?  
 
Having outlined the natural dysfunction analysis and how it has been combined with the 
software-hardware analogy to argue for the autonomy of mental dysfunction, some further 
clarifications are in order.  
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 Let us first specify the position to which proponents of the AAMD must commit. Proponents 
must commit to the view that, just as software dysfunction does not entail hardware 
dysfunction, natural mental dysfunction does not entail natural brain dysfunction. In other 
words, the following can obtain:  
 
A particular subject at a particular time could be instantiating a natural mental 
dysfunction in the absence of natural brain dysfunction.  
 
In the case that natural mental dysfunctions either: (a) are necessarily natural brain  
dysfunctions, or (b) necessarily co-occur with natural brain dysfunctions, the above cannot 
obtain. My view is that (a) is true. Natural mental dysfunctions cannot be instantiated in the 
absence of natural brain dysfunctions, because natural mental dysfunctions are natural brain 
dysfunctions.  
In order to understand this position, we must understand what it means for a mental 
dysfunction to be a brain dysfunction. More generally, we need to know what conditions some 
particular state would need to satisfy in relation to an item to count as a dysfunction of that 
item. In other words, what does it take for the failure of some process P to constitute a 
dysfunction of some item X5?  
In what follows, let ‘X’ be a schematic letter denoting some biological trait or item that may 
have one or more natural functions. X will, paradigmatically, be an organ, such as the heart. 
But X might be a mechanism, such as the urea cycle (a metabolic pathway). Let ‘P’ denote 
some process or effect. For example, P might be the process of pumping blood, or the process 
 
5 Note that I am using ‘dysfunction of X’ and ‘X dysfunction’ interchangeably to mean the same thing as well 
as, for example, ‘dysfunction of the hardware’ and ‘hardware dysfunction’ etc.  
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of producing urea from ammonia. We will use ‘¬P’ to denote the complement of P, the property 
of not doing P: the state of not pumping blood or the state of failing to produce urea from 
ammonia6. 
There are two conditions that need to be met for X’s being ¬P to constitute a dysfunction of 
X:  
 
1) X instantiates ¬P 
 
2) P is a natural function of X  
 
(1) Reminds us that it has to be X, and not something else, that fails to P, in order for failing to 
P to be a dysfunction of X. (2) tells us that ¬P is a dysfunction of X only if P is a (natural) 
function of X. X may be ¬P, but unless X has P as one of its functions, then this is not a 
dysfunction of X. However vigorously and purposefully I flap my arms, I am unable to fly, yet 
this sad state of affairs does not constitute a dysfunction, because ‘flight’ is a not a natural 
function of my arms, nor of any other part of my body. Accordingly, my inability to fly cannot 
logically constitute a natural dysfunction of any part of me.  
We can now apply this to the brain. For the failure or some mental process MP (¬MP) to be 
a dysfunction of the brain, B, it has to be the case that:  
 
 
6 ¬P technically has to be read as including the full range of not doing P properly, including doing P too much. 
It also has to be read as excluding instances where X cannot perform P only due to the fact that X is lacking one 
of the environmental preconditions for normal functioning (e.g. an appliance that cannot perform its function 




1) B instantiates ¬MP  
 
2) MP is a natural function of B  
 
We can conclude now that the AAMD entails a commitment to the view that there is logical 
‘elbow room’ for real, medical mental disorders that fail to satisfy conditions 1 and 2. In other 
words, according to the AAMD, for some mental effects, MP, the failure of that effect, ¬MP, 
can be a natural dysfunction and hence a real mental disorder, without satisfying both 1 and 2 
in relation to the brain. As noted, I do not think this can obtain. To see why, we need first to 
get clear on how software dysfunction can occur in the absence of hardware dysfunction in a 
computer.  
 
5. How is autonomous software dysfunction possible? 
 
In order to understand what it would mean for a mental dysfunction to be ‘autonomous’ from 
brain dysfunction in the sense suggested by the analogy to software-hardware, we need first to 
understand precisely how autonomous software dysfunction obtains in the case of classical 
computers7. 
 
7 What I and others in this area refer to as ‘autonomous software dysfunction’ or ‘software dysfunction without 
hardware dysfunction’ is sometimes called ‘programming error’ or ‘software design error’ in the literature on 
computation. There is some controversy within this literature as to whether software design errors count as 
genuine instances of miscomputation, or whether this status should be reserved for so-called ‘operational 
malfunctions’ – that is, breakdowns of the actual internal operations of the computational system (Fresco & 
Primiero 2013; Dewhurst 2014). This is a complicated issue, and I am largely agnostic as to whether or not 
‘design error’ should count as ‘miscomputation’. However, in the sense that there is a failure to yield the effects 
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In what follows I shall show how autonomous software dysfunction (software dysfunction 
in the absence of hardware dysfunction) is possible. I will then abstract to a more general 
model, specifying the conditions which ‘supervenient’ dysfunctions in general (i.e. realiser-
independent dysfunctions such as autonomous software dysfunction or autonomous mental 
dysfunction) have to satisfy. I will call this set of conditions the ‘Autonomous Model’. I shall 
go on to argue that the Autonomous Model is true description of a state that can obtain in the 
case of software and hardware, but that cannot obtain in the case of mind and brain, and that 
the AAMD thus fails.     
First, let us return to the software-hardware analogy. Let HW be the hardware, SW be the 
software, and SP be some software process, such as Papineau’s ‘double-spacing’. The 
following can obtain:  
 




2) SP is a function of HW 
 
In the above, the hardware instantiates ‘failure to double-space’ in that failure to double-space 
is instantiated in the hardware. However, the hardware does not have ‘double-spacing’ as a 
function. Thus, with regard to the hardware, SP satisfies 1 but not 2. Accordingly, per the 
conditions outlined, ¬SP simply cannot be a dysfunction of HW. Thus far, this case is the same 
 
intended by the software designer, ‘software design errors’ do count as dysfunctions (for discussion, see Coelho 
Mollo 2019; Tucker 2018).  
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as me flapping my arms and failing to fly. If this were the end of the story, there simply would 
be no dysfunction – whether of the hardware or of the software. However, this simple picture 
is complicated by the fact that SP is a function of a supervenient property of the hardware (i.e. 
the software, SW): 
 








2) SP is a function of HW 
 
Thus, when ¬SP (failure to double-space) is instantiated in the hardware, a dysfunction is 
occurring, and that dysfunction is located in the hardware. However, that dysfunction is not a 
dysfunction of the hardware8.  
Because this situation can obtain, autonomous software dysfunction is possible. These 
relationships can be expressed in more general terms as follows. X is an item (organ, 
mechanism etc.), P is a process, and S is a property which supervenes on X. Call this the 
Autonomous Model. 
 
8 Some readers will be familiar with the AAMD as advanced by Graham (2013). I take the above to clarify the 
‘in/of’ distinction which Graham postulates in his version of the argument for autonomous mental disorder from 












2) P is a function of X 
 
The Autonomous Model describes the components and relations necessary for autonomous 
software dysfunction and ‘supervenient’ dysfunctions more generally to be possible – stated 
simply, 1 and 3, but not 2. The reason why ‘failure to double space’ is a dysfunction of the 
software and not of the hardware is that ‘double-spacing’ is a function of the software and not 
a function of the hardware.  
 It now becomes clear that conforming to the Autonomous Model depends on some functions 
of the supervenient property, the software, not being functions of the realising property, the 
hardware. (Otherwise, ¬P would be instantiated by X in addition to P being a function of X, 
and P would as such satisfy conditions 1 and 2, as outlined, and accordingly ¬P would be an X 
dysfunction.) So to some extent, the functions of S need to ‘come apart’ from the functions of 
X. 
 Let us call this ‘functional separability’. Autonomous software dysfunction is possible, 
because functional separability obtains in the case of hardware-software. The question from 
here is: does functional separability obtain in the case of mind-brain (such that mind-brain 
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might conform to the Autonomous Model and, in turn, autonomous mental dysfunction might 
conceivably occur)? In order to answer this question, we need to know why functional 
separability obtains in software and hardware.  
 
6. Why is there ‘functional separability’ in hardware-software? 
 
Why is it that some software functions are not also hardware functions? What accounts for the 
functional separability of software-hardware (and thus the possibility of autonomous software 
dysfunction)?  
The etiological theory of function (as outlined in Section 2) tells us that P is a function of X 
when P is a selected effect of X. More precisely, P is a function of X if and only if P is an effect 
which was causally efficacious in the natural selection and design of X through evolutionary 
history. The natural selection of X through evolutionary history is X’s functional etiology. 
According to the etiological theory, functions depend upon and are the outcome of these 
histories of ‘design’ or selection.  
Because hardware software are artefacts (and as such not products of natural selection) they 
lack natural functions in a strict sense. However, artefacts too have etiological functions, which 
depend upon their histories of intentional artefact design. We might then say that P is the 
function of artefact X if and only if P is an effect which was causally efficacious in the 
intentional design of X through X’s history of design and selection (i.e. through X’s functional 
etiology). Now, are all software processes effects which were causally efficacious throughout 




 Indeed, they are not. Classical computers are general purpose processing machines9. They 
are designed to run software, not some particular kind of software. The effect of the hardware, 
which was causally efficacious in its design and thus determines its etiological function, is its 
capacity to respond accurately and predictably to software code. The particular functions of 
some particular piece of software (such as the capacity to double-space text within a word 
processing programme) need not have played any role whatsoever in the design of the 
hardware.  
 Software and hardware come about via separate functional etiologies which are sensitive to 
distinct selection pressures. Indeed, one might imagine that the hardware designers were totally 
unaware that the hardware they were designing would eventually come to run word processing 
software – never mind one with a function such as ‘double-spacing’. The capacity to double-
space, in such a scenario, is entirely causally impotent in the etiology of the hardware. The 
effect which explains the structure and existence of the hardware is its general-purpose 
processing capacity, not any particular software or the peculiar software-functions thereof. It 
follows straightforwardly from the etiological theory of function that ‘double-spacing’ is not a 
hardware function.  
However, ‘double-spacing’ was causally efficacious in the development of a different 
product – the software. One might imagine that the software designers meditated deeply over 
how to best configure processes such as ‘double-spacing’ into the code for their word 
processing software, whilst the hardware designers enjoyed their blissful ignorance of these 
 
9 There are computational systems (sometimes called ‘dedicated computers’) where the software in so 
embedded in the hardware that the hardware really is designed for a single hardwired, computational process 
and there is no ‘software’ in the modern sense. These, however, are not computers in which autonomous 




software-specific concerns. This is what gives rise to functional separability. Because ‘double-
spacing’ and other particular software effects are selected effects of the software but not of the 
hardware they logically cannot constitute hardware dysfunctions. Thus, the possibility of 
autonomous software dysfunction arises. 
We might update the Autonomous Model accordingly: 
  








2) P is a selected effect of X  
 
The question from here becomes: is the computer analogy (upon clarification) a good one? Are 
the functions of mind and brain analogously separable (such that the Autonomous Model might 
obtain in this case)? 
 
7. Does functional separability obtain in the case of mind-brain? 
 
In order for the Autonomous Model accurately to reflect what in fact occurs in some cases of 
mental disorder, the selected effects of the mind would have to (sometimes, at least) fail to be 
selected effects of the brain.  
 
 21 
This simply cannot obtain. There is no way in which a mental process can be a naturally 
selected effect of the mind but not of the brain10. The only way in which a natural mental 
function (that is, a genetically selected mental effect) can be configured into the mind via 
phylogenetic evolution is by being causally efficacious in the natural selection of the 
implementing organ – i.e. the brain. To imply otherwise would be to succumb to dualism. It is 
not the case that the mind reproduces when the brain does not, nor that the brain dies while the 
mind lives on. Natural mental functions come about by brains yielding mental effects which 
confer a fitness advantage upon their organisms, thus causing the corresponding genotype to 
spread through the population. There is no alternative mechanism of action by which natural 
functions could arise. There is, in other words, no ‘mindware’-designer through which the 
mental derives distinct norms of operation. Mind-brain owes its structure and functional set-up 
to a single process of evolution by natural selection acting upon the properties and 
characteristics of a single physical trait. In terms of inter-generational genetic selection, mind-
brain develop as one.     
Let us consider a concrete example. Fear is a mental effect. This is just to say that it is an 
effect, and that it is mental and phenomenal in nature. Fear plays a vital role in signalling 
danger, as well as in aiding our escape from predators and other threats via the activation of 
the sympathetic nervous system, and is as such very plausibly naturally selected. In other 
words, fear is a natural mental function.  
Uncontroversially, the structure and existence of the amygdalae are at least partly explained, 
in evolutionary terms, by their role in generating fear. Fear is, as such, a naturally selected 
effect of the brain. Moreover, there is no sense in which the ‘mental component’ of fear was 
 
10 Or, strictly speaking, some other part of the body – but we have already conceded that all mental processes 




naturally selected independently of its physical implementation in the brain. The mind (in terms 
of inter-generational genetic transmission) lives and dies with the brain. We are accordingly 
not in a position to postulate some separate process of natural mental design, and thus separable 
mental functions. 
This point bears emphasising. The mere fact that ‘fear’ is a mental or psychological effect 
does not imply that the brain was not naturally selected for the performance of it. Of course, 
the brain was designed not just for paradigmatic brain-things, like synaptic pruning or motor 
control, but for paradigmatic mental things, like mind-reading, emotion or memory. The 
phenomenal character of mental processes obviously does not exclude them from being 
causally relevant to the natural selection of the organ which implements them. Indeed, there is 
no such relation. 
In other words, failures of natural mental functions necessarily satisfy conditions 1 and 2 in 
relation to the brain. Natural mental dysfunctions are as such necessarily natural brain 
dysfunctions. 
 




2) MP is a selected effect of B 
 
Assuming that natural brain dysfunction is sufficient for brain disorder (as per the natural 




We can now reject Papineau’s premise 3. Mind-brain are not analogous to software-
hardware, and the AAMD fails to support its purported conclusion. Autonomous mental 
disorders (in the sense implied by the computer analogy) are a biological impossibility. 
 
8. Objections  
 
In this final section, I respond to three possible objections. First, (8.1) I consider whether 
ontogenetically selected mental effects can provide proponents of the AAMD with the kind of 
‘functional separability’ required to conform to the Autonomous Model. I briefly comment on 
why a proponent of the AAMD might not want to go down this road, before explaining why 
ontogenetically selected effects are, in any case, no threat to the argument I have advanced in 
this paper. In Section 8.2, I respond to the claim that multiply realised mental dysfunctions are 
ipso facto not brain dysfunctions (and thus not brain disorders). I argue that multiple 
realisability is unrelated to ascriptions of function and dysfunction in the brain, and indeed 
elsewhere. Finally, in Section 8.3, I consider the implications of the argument I have provided 
for those theorists within the philosophy of medicine who reject the natural dysfunction 
analysis of mental disorder.   
 
8.1 What about ontogenetically selected effects? 
 
Ontogenetically selected mental effects are effects which are selected intra-individually 
through development, rather than inter-generational genetic selection. For example, my ability 
to recognise the letter B is a mental function, but was selected through learning and lifetime 
ontogeny as opposed to genetic evolution. Could appealing to ontogenically selected effects 
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give proponents of the AAMD the separability of mental and neural functions required by the 
Autonomous Model? 
 My response to this objection is two-pronged. I shall first argue that including 
ontogenetically selected effects within the category of natural functions threatens to undermine 
a central premise of the AAMD: the natural dysfunction analysis. I shall then argue that 
appealing to ontogenetically selected effects would not in any case salvage the AAMD, as 
ontogenetically selected effects are still selected effects of the brain and thus count as brain 
functions.  
 Firstly, it is not clear that failures of ontogenetically selected effects should be included in 
an analysis of medical disorder. Indeed, as I have defined disorder from Section 2 onwards (via 
Neander’s version of the etiological theory, which appeals directly to selection at the level of 
the genotype), ontogenetically selected effects are excluded. They have also tended to be 
excluded from dysfunction-based accounts in philosophy of medicine traditionally (Boorse 
1977, 2014; Wakefield 1992, 1999, 2014b; Matthewson & Griffiths 2018). Including failures 
of ontogenetically selected effects in the natural dysfunction analysis of disorder would thus 
require an additional theoretical move – a broadening of the notion of natural function to 
encompass lifetime-selected effects as well as genetically selected effects (see for example 
Garson, 2017; 2019)11.  
 This move may not be favourable to the natural dysfunction analysis (and thus to the 
AAMD) for two sets of reasons: the possibility of (1) ‘healthy’ ontogenetic dysfunctions and 
 
11 I take the view, contra Garson’s Generalised Selected Effects Theory (2017; 2019), that ontogenetically 
selected effects and genetically selected effects should be separated in a theory of function. I believe they play 
distinct roles and that forcing them to operate as one leads to contradictions and conflicts in functional norms. 
Expanding upon why would lead us too far afield, but this is another reason to be suspicious of any ontogenetic 
broadening of the natural dysfunction analysis.  
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(2) ‘disordered’ ontogenetic functions. As an example of the former, consider a woman who 
unlearns a lifetime of deeply ingrained bad habits. She is now failing to do something which 
was selected for through lifetime learning and ontogeny – but is she disordered? As examples 
of the latter: it seems possible that some psychiatric disorders, such as phobias or OCD, may 
be selected through normal learning and conditioning. Recall the famous case of Watson and 
Rayner’s Little Albert, who was conditioned to fear rats and other furry things (1920). 
Arguably an ontogenetically selected effect, but plausibly a disorder nonetheless.  
Secondly, even were we to adopt a broadened version of the natural dysfunction analysis, 
ontogenetically selected mental effects still would not deliver the autonomous mental functions 
required by the Autonomous Model. The selection of mental processes through lifetime 
ontogeny is no less neural than their natural selection through evolution; in each case it is a 
matter a neural item (region, circuit, synapse, etc.) being selected because it yields some mental 
effect. Genetically selected mental effects, like the fight-or-flight response, are selected via the 
transmission of genes through differential intergenerational reproduction. Ontogenetically 
selected effects, like your ability to read English, are selected via mechanisms of neuroplastic 
adaptation (synapse selection, construction, changes to existing synaptic connections, repeated 
activation, or neurogenesis, to name some possible candidates) (Garson 2019; Lilliard & Erisir 
2011). If a neural item persists because it yields a mental effect, then that mental effect is a 
selected effect of the brain12. Selected effects of the brain are brain functions. Whether the 
implementing trait was favoured by genetic or neural selection is of no consequence.  
We can put this in terms of the conditions outlined in the above. If (1) the failure of mental 
process MP (¬MP) is instantiated by the brain (B) and (2) MP is an ontogenetically selected 
effect of the brain, then ¬MP is an ontogenetic brain dysfunction. If ¬MP is an ontogenetic 
 
12 See Garson (2019) and Garson & Papineau (2019) for a similar argument in defence of teleosemantics. 
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brain dysfunction, and ontogenetic dysfunctions count as medical disorders (per the broadened 
version of the natural dysfunction analysis, against which I have just cautioned), then ¬MP 
counts as a brain disorder. If ¬MP counts as a brain disorder, then ¬MP is not a candidate for 
autonomous mental disorder. Thus, the objection from ontogenetically selected effects fails.  
But why aren’t autonomous software functions, in the very same respect, functions of the 
realising hardware?13 Let us make the disanalogy between autonomous software functions and 
ontogenetic mental functions explicit. In modern general-purpose processers, software is a set 
of instructions written in programming language which tells any compatible hardware how to 
execute the software according to the specifications of its designer. When the software is 
installed onto the realising hardware, the hardware changes its physical state in a number of 
ways – for example, electronic circuits are turned on and off. But this is no part of the software 
design as such. The autonomous software functions are fully fledged etiological artefact 
functions, quite independently of their eventual realisation in the hardware, because they were 
selected for at the software writing stage – a stage which is both separate from and precedent 
to any physical state-changes in the hardware.  
In fact, the process of designing the software functions is often entirely abstracted away 
from the physical details of the hardware which later comes to implement them. When software 
is written in a so-called ‘general purpose’ programming language (such as Python or Java) it 
can be implemented using a broad range of physical hardware, with the help of ‘compilers’ 
 
13 I think there is a good sense in which autonomous software functions (contrary to ontogenetic and natural 
mental functions) really are not hardware functions (for reasons which I expand upon in this section). Note 
however that protestations to the contrary would not serve the proponent of the AAMD. If all software functions 
are ipso facto hardware functions, then the analogy from software malfunction to mental disorder does not even 
get off the ground; if there is no autonomous software dysfunction to begin with, then the issue of autonomous 
mental dysfunction does not even arise.  
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which translate the general programming language into domain specific instructions which can 
be understood by the specific hardware’s central processing unit. As such, the software 
designer need not have had any particular state of hardware in mind when configuring effects 
such as ‘double spacing’ (and similar software-specific functions) into the code at the software 
writing stage.    
Contrast this with how ontogenetic mental functions come about. Ontogenetic mental 
functions are direct products of neuroplastic selection mechanisms acting upon the physical 
structure of the brain. That’s it. There is no pre-neural writing of abstract instructions which 
could, even in principle, confer autonomous ontogenetic functions upon the supervenient 
mind14. This is the disanalogy. Autonomous software functions owe their status as functions, 
not to adaptations in the hardware, but to modifications to the software code prior to (and 
abstracted from) the software’s physical realisation. In mind-brain, on the other hand, there is 
no ‘mindware’ (nor any precedent process of design) – just the developing brain, and a variety 
of neuroplastic changes throughout its ontogeny. There is simply no mind-brain analogue to 
the writing of software which could provide the etiological separability which obtains between 
software and hardware.15 
 
14 Perhaps you are wondering, upon reading this, whether appealing to some other form of normativity, such as 
evolutive norms or cultural norms, might yield the separability required. I address this possible objection section 
8. 3.   
15 Do the switches and circuits of the hardware inherit the autonomous software functions upon having the 
software installed unto it? I don’t think this is the case – that is, I don’t think the intended functions of the 
instructions are imbued upon that which executes them. Consider an analogy. Imagine that Jane, the composer, 
designs a piece of piano music which is intended to serve as background music for a five-minute-long scene in a 
new film. Joe, the piano player, has received the sheet music and shows up for the first day of recording and 
performs the piece. The piece, it turns out, lasts only four minutes; Jane has made a mistake. Does Joe, by 
playing the piece, inherit the intended functions of the sheet music such that ‘being five minutes long’ is not just 
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 In short, there is no more etiological separability in ontogeny then there is in evolution. 
Mind and brain, whether by evolution or by development, come about as one. It is simply not 
the case that ontogenetic selection acts on the ‘mindware’ in isolation from the physical brain. 
As such, even if we resolve to sideline our earlier conceptual concerns, an appeal to ontogenetic 
selection is not going to deliver the kind of functional separability required by the Autonomous 
Model. If some particular ontogenetic mental function (such as the ability to speak Swahili or 
navigate a cab around London) has been configured into your mind, this is because the brain 
has adapted, through neuroplastic action, to perform that particular ontogenetic function. 




8.2 What about multiply realised mental dysfunctions? 
 
 
a selected effect of the music piece but also of Joe, the piano player? Was Joe supposed to play for five minutes, 
even though the sheet music instructed him to play for four? It is hard to see how this could be the case. The 
intended duration of the piece is a selected effect of the sheet music, not of Joe. Joe’s job is just to play the sheet 
music correctly.  
16 As a final nail in the coffin, consider that, even barring all of the above, the proponent of AAMD (in pursuing 
this line of retort) would have to commit herself to the view that mental disorders are (generally speaking) 
characterised by failures of ontogenetically selected effects and brain disorders by failures of evolutionarily 
selected effects. This analysis fits poorly with usage, however. Forgetting one’s native language, for example, is 
the failure of an ontogenically selected effect but seemingly more neurological than psychiatric. Similarly, it is 
not clear what ontogenetic function (if any) is violated in paradigm cases of mental disorder such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar and generalised anxiety. Perception, emotion and fight-or-flight are mental functions 
alright, but very plausibly naturally selected. 
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Some in the literature mistake the possibility of multiple realised mental functions for evidence 
for autonomous mental disorder. The intuition is perhaps something like this: even if the human 
brain was naturally selected to produce the mental function ‘fear’, it still possible that different 
people’s brains ‘do fear’ in relevantly distinct ways. Surely, being multiply realised at the level 
of neurobiology, these kinds of effects do not properly constitute brain functions, nor the failure 
to produce them brain dysfunctions? 
While I am happy to grant the in-principle possibility of multiply realised mental functions, 
as I shall go on to show, whether or not some mental dysfunction is multiply realised at the 
level of neural implementation is simply unrelated to whether it is, or is not, a brain 
dysfunction. My primary aim in this paper has been to show that the computer analogy does 
not apply to the case of mind-brain, and thus that mental dysfunction without brain dysfunction 
(in the sense implied by the computer analogy) cannot obtain. A secondary aim has been to 
clarify how the argument for autonomous mental disorder actually works. Part of this entails 
theoretically distinguishing the AAMD from the supposition that mental dysfunctions may be 
multiply realised.  
Jefferson has recently offered an argument that mental disorders should be understood as 
brain disorders if and only if they can be shown to track underlying neural regularities (2020). 
If a mental disorder is multiply realised at the level of neurobiology, then it is autonomous. 
Jefferson invokes the computer analogy, but is of the mistaken view (along with others in this 
area, Papineau included) that the computer analogy illustrates an implication of non-reductive 
physicalism.  
Indeed, as I hope to have established, the possibility of mental dysfunction in the absence 
of brain dysfunction depends on the applicability of the computer analogy to the case of mind-
brain (which in turn depends on functional separability). If the analogy is truly apt, then mental 
dysfunction can occur in the absence of brain dysfunction, and mental disorder without brain 
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disorder is possible. The possibility of multiply realised mental dysfunctions does not bear 
upon this at all. To see why, let us consider some less controversial cases of multiple realisation.  
The functional kind ‘corkscrew’ can be realised in many distinct physical types (winged, 
lever, mounted, air-pressure etc.). Whether failure to uncork bottles constitutes a dysfunction 
of some particular, say, winged corkscrew depends on whether that particular corkscrew (1) 
has uncorking bottles as a function, and (2) is as a matter of fact failing to uncork bottles. 
Whether other artefacts also have uncorking as a function is of no relevance in determining 
this. 
Consider convergent evolution. The functional kind ‘flight’ is multiply realised in several 
distinct biological types (insects, birds, bats etc). These distinct physical realisations were all 
naturally selected for flight and, as such, have ‘flight ‘among their natural functions. As such, 
should any one of these aerial organisms, such as a particular bat, be unable to perform flight, 
that would constitute a dysfunction of (some part of) that bat. The fact that other organisms 
have flight as a function, and as such may also be capable of instantiating failure to perform 
flight, is of no relevance whatsoever to whether some particular token bat is functioning as it 
should. 
The implication for the brain is straightforward. Suppose that in Tom’s brain ‘fear’ is 
realised by some particular neural circuit N1. Suppose further that in Greg’s brain ‘fear’ is 
realised by some other neural circuit N2. Nevertheless, assuming N1 and N2 were selected for 
their performance of the mental function ‘fear’, neural circuit N1 and neural circuit N2 still 
have ‘fear’ as a function. As such, if N2 in Tom’s brain were to fail to perform ‘fear’, that 
failure would constitute a failure of neural circuit N2 to perform its function – that is, a 
dysfunction of N2.  
Just as we agreed in the case of the corkscrew and the flightless bat, how ‘fear’ is 
implemented in Greg’s brain is entirely tangential to whether N2 in Tom’s brain is functioning 
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as it should. Whether failure to perform fear constitutes a dysfunction of N2 depends on (1) 
whether N2 is failing to perform ‘fear’, and (2) whether N2 has ‘fear’ as a function. Multiple 
realisability does not enter into the equation. Assuming, as I do, and as Jefferson indeed also 
does, that brain dysfunction is (per the natural dysfunction analysis) sufficient for brain 
disorder, it follows that mental disorders are brain disorders necessarily (whether or not they 
are multiple realised). Multiple realisability is tangential to the applicability of the computer 
analogy to the case of mental disorder, and it was simply a misunderstanding to think that the 
latter hinged on the former. 
 
8.3 What of those who subscribe to a different theory of mental disorder? 
 
The version of the AAMD which I have targeted thus far in this paper proceeds explicitly from 
the natural dysfunction analysis of disorder, or something akin to it. There are however many 
theorists in the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry who invoke the analogy to software-
hardware to disprove that mental disorders are brain disorders, but without anything like the 
natural dysfunction analysis in mind. Possible candidates here include Cooper (2007), Graham 
(2013) and Arpali (2005)17. I shall, in what follows, briefly sketch what I take to be the 
implications of the argument I have provided for those who reject a natural dysfunction analysis 
of mental disorder.  
As noted, part of my objective in this paper, beyond refuting the AAMD, has been to clarify 
what it is about the nature and functional set-up of software and hardware which allows for the 
possibility of autonomous software dysfunction and, in turn, why it is so suggestive when 
invoked in psychiatric contexts. I have argued that autonomous software dysfunction depends 
 
17 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pushing me on the issues addressed in this section. 
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on functional separability; not all software functions are hardware functions, not all software 
norms are hardware norms.   
This analysis, I believe, still stands whether or not one accepts a natural dysfunction analysis 
of mental disorder. Anyone who claims that mental disorders are autonomous from brain 
disorders, just like software problems are autonomous from hardware problems in a computer, 
needs to be able to demonstrate that functional separability obtains in the case of mind-brain – 
whether one subscribes to a naturalist, a normativist or some other analysis of mental disorder. 
If functional separability does not obtain then mental disorders are not autonomous from brain 
disorders in the same way that software problems are autonomous from hardware problems in 
a computer. If so, the computer analogy is a red herring, and best left untouched18.  
Having established this, the question thus becomes; would adopting a different analysis of 
mental disorder, in place of the natural dysfunction analysis, lead the proponent of AAMD 
down a more favourable path? Would it allow her to show that functional separability obtains, 
and that the computer analogy does apply? There are two main routes the proponent of AAMD, 
and enemy of the natural dysfunction analysis of mental disorder, might take. I shall examine 
the prospects for each in turn.  
(1) Firstly, she could reject the natural dysfunction analysis wholesale. That is, she could 
adopt a single monist theory of medical disorder in place of the natural dysfunction analysis 
(for example, one that is value-relative) and apply it to the body at large, including the mind 
and brain. For example, Cooper holds that a disorder is a “a bad thing to have, that is such that 
 
18 There may well be other ways of distinguishing paradigm mental disorders from paradigm brain disorders, but 
if there is no functional separability, mental disorders are not distinguished from brain disorders in that they are 
like software bugs in the ‘mindware’ which the brain runs. For example, Bolton has suggested that paradigm 
brain disorders tend to be characterised by being comparatively less sensitive to forms of psychosocial 
intervention (2013).  
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we consider the afflicted person to have been unlucky, and that can potentially be medically 
treated” (2002, 271). Cooper takes this analysis to apply across the board to somatic as well as 
mental conditions. What would this imply for the possibility of autonomous mental disorder?   
Well, a mental disorder would be a bad, unlucky, mental thing that could potentially be 
medically treated. An autonomous mental disorder would be a bad, unlucky and potentially 
treatable mental process realised by some neurobiological process that does not itself satisfy 
these criteria. But surely, if having some particular mental state is bad, unlucky and in-principle 
subject to medical intervention, then this applies also to its underlying neural state? How could 
one be unlucky to have the mental state, but not the neural state which, as a matter of necessity, 
realises it19?  
Any proponent of the AAMD who accepts a single theory of mental and somatic disorder 
would have to answer a similar set of questions. As such, a non-naturalist theory of disorder 
does not in and of itself do much to substantiate separability between mental norms of 
functioning and neural functions. However, there is another another possible route that the 
proponent of AAMD could take: she could reject the natural dysfunction analysis only for 
mental disorder.  
(2) The proponent of the AAMD could take the view that mental disorders and brain 
disorders are subject to distinct definitional criteria. For example, she could hold that brain 
disorders are constituted by natural dysfunction (the failure of the brain to yield one or more 
of its naturally selected effects, as already discussed) and that mental disorders, in contrast, are 
constituted by violations of evaluative, cultural or personal norms. One possible line of 
 
19 Remember that, even per non-reductive physicalism, the underlying neural state is sufficient for producing the 
supervenient mental state. There is accordingly no scenario in which you could instantiate the underlying neural 
state without it realising the disordered mental state. It is as such hard to see how the ‘bad luck’ in having the 
mental state could come apart from its neural implementation.  
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reasoning here is to think of mental disorders as infringements on norms which have arisen 
through the intergenerational transmission of traits by cumulative cultural evolution (see Boyd 
& Richardson 1996, 2005)20.  
In contrast to (1), (2) would actually provide functional separability. Because the norms of 
functioning to which the mind is subject, on this view, are distinct and separable from the 
naturally selected brain functions, one could have mental dysfunction (say, failure of the mind 
to conform to some evaluative norm of what it is good to feel or think) without any brain 
dysfunction (in the absence of any infringement on the evolutionarily conditioned norms of 
functioning against which the brain is judged). I readily concede that the argument provided 
thus far in this paper has no real teeth against this view. Following strategy (2), mental disorder 
without brain disorder is possible. Before closing however, I shall outline two reasons to doubt 
the viability – or at least, attractiveness – of this position.    
Firstly, the proponent of position (2) would have to concede that she is really talking about 
two different things. The claim that ‘mental disorder does not entail brain disorder’ ought really 
to be read as ‘mental disorder1 does not entail brain disorder2’. This is less surprising prima 
facie and less interesting in substance. Some of the attraction of the AAMD as advanced by 
Papineau and Wakefield was that it purported to show how the mind could become disordered 
 
20 I have said that ontogenetically selected effects cannot serve to substantiate the AAMD, and now I am about 
to say that culturally selected effects perhaps could, so (to avoid confusion) let me be clear about precisely what 
I take the difference to be. I take ontogenetically selected effects to be effects which have caused their 
corresponding traits to have been selected on a developmental timescale intra-individually. Neural selection is 
the paradigm example, but the selection of antibodies is another possible case (Garson 2019). Culturally 
selected effects, on the contrary, are selected, usually inter-generationally, but at least inter-individually within 
groups which can be said to make up ‘cultures’, e.g., the intergenerational transmission of gendered practices 
(see Godman 2018).  
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on the very same terms as the brain, but without the brain states themselves instantiating 
corresponding disorder. It is somewhat less intriguing to find out that all brain processes doing 
what they were designed for by evolution is compatible with a mental process simultaneously 
failing to conform to some entirely distinct norm. We should have expected this to be the case 
at the outset.  
Secondly, in accepting a distinct definitional criterion for mental disorder, unrelated to that 
which defines somatic disorder, the proponent of the AAMD is now left open to the anti-
psychiatric challenge the argument was originally conceived to rebut: that mental disorders are 
not real disorders. Suppose that real disorder – in the mind of a critic of psychiatry – means 
disorders in the same sense as, or at least with some reasonably strict analogy to, paradigm 
neural and somatic disorders. The proponent of the AAMD would have to concede that mental 
disorders are not real in this sense – precisely because she employs distinct criteria in the 
mental and the somatic cases. On her view, mental disorders share nothing definitionally in 
common with somatic and biomedical disorders. They are not the same kind of thing.   
There is nothing inconsistent about strategy (2), and it does provide for autonomous mental 
dysfunction. However, it is less interesting and less surprising than the AAMD as originally 
presented, and it fails to solve one of the key theoretical problems which the argument was 
originally introduced to remedy. In short, you may get autonomous mental disorders – but at 
what cost? 
 
9. Concluding Remarks  
 
I have argued that the AAMD fails to support its stated conclusion. Because the selection 
histories which give rise to the functions of software-hardware are distinct and separable, the 
functions of software-hardware are also separable. This is what provides for the possibility of 
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software problems in the absence of hardware problems or ‘autonomous software dysfunction’. 
Mind-brain, on the other hand, develops as one, subject to the same selection pressures. There 
is as such no analogous disassociation of mental functions from brain functions, and the 
AAMD thus fails.   
The possibility of autonomous software dysfunction does not extend to imply the possibility 
of autonomous mental disorder as has traditionally been purported in philosophy of medicine 
and psychiatry. In fact, the natural dysfunction analysis of disorder, as defended by Wakefield, 
Papineau, Neander and others, implies a view of mental disorders as brain disorders 
necessarily; not because mental dysfunctions are reducible to types of neurophysiological 
abnormality, but because natural mental functions are naturally selected effects of the brain, in 
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